Deni iyo Bulshada Gaalkacayo

THE COASTAL DAROD AND THE PROTECTORATE GOVERNMENT IN JUBBALAND. HARTI KOONFUREED LEGACY QAAB DHISMEEDKA HARTI KOONFUREED IYO SALDANADI KISMAYO GOBWEIN YONTE/YOONTOOY The simple sub-clan structure of the Herti had also been a factor facilitating the settlement. For the Dolbahanta Herti were largely confined to Italian Somaliland, and there were not many Warsangeli around ICismayu. Thus the Jubaland Herti were almost all Mijertein; Ali Nahar was head of the Ali Suleiman, the most numerous section. of the Mijertein, and Shirwar Ismail was head of the Osman Mahmoud, the chiefly Herti lineage which was nevertheless rather small. Together they formed a powerful partnership. The only other Mijer- tein sections which were particularly numerous were the Ismail Suleiman and the Omar Mahmoud, and the latter proved to he especially uncooperative.. The acceptance of Government protection was not just an idle gesture on the part of the Herti. It placed Ali Nahar and Shirwar Ismail firmly on the Government side and ranged them against the Ogaden. Their continuing loyalty was, in fact, later explained in terms of the latent rivalry within the Darod clan-family, hut 2 there were also other reasons. As Sheik Ali Nahar was at pains to explain to Murgham Yusuf, yonte and other Herti villages were within easy striking distance of Kismayu, and their cooperation 3with the Government was basically a recognition of this reality. At the same time Oraufurd made full use of this new Herti willingness to cooperate. He almost immediately appointed Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar Political Officers, and used them as part of 4 a propaganda campaign to make the Ogaden more conciliatory. They accompanied tvro expeditions to Afmadu, the first in November 18959 the second in January 1896, Craufurd hoped nto impress upon Sultan Murgham Yusuf of the Ogaden Somalis the fact that Potentates of equal importance held obedience and. service to Her Majesty’s Representative to be honourable”.-^- Murgham Yusuf, however, was no ^impressed, and branded Shirwar Ismail as a traitor and a slave of the ferengi (Europeans), Nevertheless, it was probably the refusal of Ali Nahar to support the Ogaden in any act of hostility, or even to remain neutral if war broke out, that forced the Ogaden reluctantly to accept the intrusion of Government 2forces into the Afmadu area. However, the tendency of Jenner, and later Sub-Commissioners at Kismayu, to rely exclusively on Ali Nahar for the implementation of their policies ^undoubtedly caused some resentment. The local administration increasingly ignored the Herti council, though it is difficult to assess to what extent Ali Nahar followed their example. Shirwar Ismail died in 1900, but, during the last years of his life, Ali Nahar was assumed to be primarily responsible for controlling 3 the Herti. Also, since Mohamed Shirwar was too young to become Sultan on his father’s death, Ali Nahar was appointed Regent. The first signs of discontent came in 1896, when Ali Nahar was stabbed in the back by Hamed Muhammad Ali, a nondescript Herti trouble-maker. Jenner had already asked him to arrest Hamed, but the Isa Mahmoud Mijertein had protected the latter in the hope of embarrassing and discrediting Ali Nahar, As a result of this assault Ali Nahar was allowed to employ four more men to “assist 1 and protect him in the execution of his duty”. Yet the number was evidently-not enough, for a few years later Ali Nahar had to request further help from Jenner. Several Herti were refusing to obey his orders and were intriguing against him. Both the Warsangel and the Omar Mahmoud Mijertein were- inclined to be uncooperative and the two ring-leaders had to be deported to Mombasa before the 2 situation could be brought under control. By and large it seems that the more a Somali leader cooperated with the administration, the less authority he would have over his own followers and hence the less use he would be to the Protectorate Government. In the search for collaborators this was a dilemma that was not noticed often, though there are many telling references to the extreme weakness of those Somali chiefs the administration felt it could rely on most. However, Ali Nahar himself certainly experienced. something of the problem and Jenner wrote that “he admitted it himself that his power amongst the Herti had considerably waned since he entered Government service”. Ali Nahar1 s position was strengthened by his appointment as Regent, but a crisis finally developed in 1906, when an Osman Mahmoud Mijertein named Ashgar proclaimed himself ‘Mullah’ and began to collect followers near Yonte. Salkeld, who was then the Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, acted at once before a movement could develop and Ashgar was killed in a skirmish. There can be no doubt that Salkeld thought he had prevented a movement similar 3 to that of “Muhammad Abdille Nassau’ s” spreading to Jubaland, and this was an obsessive preoccupation at that time.^’ At the Colonial Office, news of Salkeld* s quick handling of what was assumed to have been a potential uprising was met with considerable approval, and one official minuteds “this method of dealing with Mullahs must save a great deal of blood-shed”; while Winston Churchill, then Under Secretary of State, added tartly “doubtless some Cromwell I™ guiltless of his country’s blood”.But how far did Ashgar’s reputedly ‘seditious preaching’ represent a serious politico- religious movement? Salkeld’s precipiNevertheless, it is obviously significant that Ashgar had only been in Jubaland a short time, and that the previous year he had visited Sheik Muhammad in northern Somalia. Undoubtedly there was contact between the Jubaland Herti and those in the British Protectorate. How much contact is not known but a number of Herti associated with Ashgar appear to have been traders rather than pastoralists, aad so may be presumed to have kept in touch with the north. One in particular, Ahmed Abdi had been to Lamu, Mombasa and Nairobi. He had written articles for the East African Standard t and there can be little doubt that he would have been well acquainted with Sheikh Muhammad’s rebellion. The administrative authorities in Jubaland were convinced that the trouble had been caused by 1″northern chiefs”tate action, above all the early death of Ashgar and the lack of any proper subsequent investigation into the incident, has made an evaluation of these proceedings extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it is obviously significant that Ashgar had only been in Jubaland a short time, and that the previous year he had visited Sheik Muhammad in northern Somalia. Undoubtedly there was contact between the Jubaland Herti and those in the British Protectorate. How much contact is not known but a number of Herti associated with Ashgar appear to have been traders rather than pastoralists, aad so may be presumed to have kept in touch with the north. One in particular, Ahmed Abdi had been to Lamu, Mombasa and Nairobi. He had written articles for the East African Standard t and there can be little doubt that he would have been well acquainted with Sheikh Muhammad’s rebellion. The administrative authorities in Jubaland were convinced that the trouble had been caused by 1″northern chiefs” Sheik Muhammad’s .iihad had initially at least been closely associated with the Salihiyya brotherhood (tariqa) and it is interesting that the first representative (khalifa) of that tariqa in Jubaland, Sheik Ali Nairobi, should have arrived in 1906. The exact date of his arrival is not known, though it was probably after Ashgar had been killed for he was never associated with his movement. However, most of Sheik Ali*s supporters were drawn from those Herti sub-clans and lineages that had given their support to Ashgar, though, perhaps remarkably, he x-ras never associated with sedition and his tariqa never seems to have had a political impact. Ashgar1s death had other repercussions however. The Omar Mahmoud Mijertein and the Warsangeli held that Ali Nahar was responsible for Ashgar’s death and out of revenge five men from 2 these two sections murdered him in Mayl906. The Dan Wadag and Yusuf Ali sub-sections of the Osman Mahmoud Mijertein were also implicated, since they had assisted the murderers, but other 3 sections remained loyal to the Government. For a short time there was a real possibility of internecine civil war amongst the Herti, 4 though in the end this was avoided.” The administrators at Kismayu, however, wished to undertake active measures to punish the murderers, while the Governor, Hayes Sadler, fearing complications thoughtthe 5imposition of a fine and an embargo on Herti trade the best policy. let this was a policy that achieved its objective slowly. It contributed therefore to the climate of uncertainty that surrounded Government relations with the Herti, and in the end it necessitated a re-examination of that relationship, ^erious consideration was given to the possibility of abolishing the Herti Sultanate. Though this step was not taken it was decided to give Government pay to more heads of Herti sections, and to utilise these officials for the implementation of Government policy. The earlier attempt to control the Herti through their Sultan, or his wakil (attorney), was thus reversed. Some attempt was also made to revise the near monopoly of Government jobs enjoyed by the Herti. It was recognised that the Warsangeli had the Omar Mabmoud Mijertein were creating trouble and refusing to pay their fine, because in this way they hoped to .The initial intention of the administration at kismayu had been to offer-a share of the advantages of Government to both the Ogaden and the Herti. Crufuard had advanced the view that pending the institution of direct control bj Government Officials, the employment of the natives of the territory … a politic aad economical proceeding. And this had been accepted by Lord Salisbury, then the Secretary of State, without comment. In 3896, the Ogaden had been allowed to select two men for employment in the customs department, with the promise of further jobs if they behaved themselves well. But the necessity of undertaking punitive expeditions against the Ogaden-in 1898 and in 1901 made it impossible to employ them at the same time. On the other hand, from January 1896, Herti were employed as 2 scouts and mail-runners. A number were also trained as Government askaris aad some served in Uganda for four years. They supported the Government in 1898 and so secured the implacable hatred of the Ogaden. The following year three Herti were killed in a serious dispute over grazing rights with the Ogaden, and Herti askaris were involved in the fighting. They also participated eagerly in the punitive expedition of 1901, which was brought about by the 157 murder of Jenner and many of his Herti escort and in December 1901over 100 Herti were fighting with the Government against the Ogaden. Moreover, after 1898 all the Kismayu police were recruited from the Herti, and one of Aii Nahar* a brothers was a Sergeant 2 Major. They were also used with considerable success to see Aulihan and other Ogaden cattle In 1897 and 1898. Police parties were frequently sent to reconnoitre and bring back intelligence of Ogaden movements during periods of hostility. Jenner thought the use of Herti policy in 1898 had “obviated on more than one occasion the employment of military force”, and he therefore proposed an increase in pay for all Herti chiefs as a reward. In the last year of his life, Jenner also thought of using his Somali police to open up the interior to administrative control. In 3899 he had advocated setting up a military station at Bardera, but a year later he wrote? “I think, however, I was wrong, and that 5our principle ought to be to dot these cheap police posts about”. Consequently Jenner had tried to recruit Ogaden police as well. A few were accepted in February 1899, and a year later there were over forty. In 19^0 Abdurrahman Mursaal, bead of the Aulihan Ogaden, was sent to establish a customs post at Serenli with eighteen police. There was also a plan to open a post at Wajir, but Jenner1 s death led once more to a monopoly in the Jubaland police force of the Herti, and their use dn a semi-military capacity against the Ogaden, Yet even when peace was restored, the Ogaden felt that the Herti police were biased against them, and they also resented having to deal with the Herti as intermediaries between them and the Government. They wanted direct contact 2with the administration. The most important Herti intermediary was Adam Musa, the Government Interpreter. His wide experience had singled him out for special attention by both Graufurd and Jenner. Adam Musa had lived for many years in Aden, and his earlier services to the Government had earned him Her Majesty’s Egypt medal with the caslp for ‘El Teb’, and the Khedive’s star for the campaign in the Eastern Sudan 3 in 1884. He was clearly a man who oould be trusted with responsibility. The Ogaden naturalfer coveted the post of Government Interpreter, and felt that the choice of a Herti was particularly inappropriate when it came to handling their own relations with the administration. Moreover, although Adam Musa at first did no more than accompany Craufurd and Jenner on their visits to Afmadu, he was soon given important additional duties In 1897 it was suggested that he should be sent to Serenli with sixty Somali irregulars to build a fort and temporary post 2 there. The following year he played a crucial role in arranging a settlement between the Ogaden and the Government. His instructions were to obtain an acknowledgement from the Ogaden that they owed obedience to the Government. Once this had been achieved he was given the responsibility of collecting a fine that had been agreed to The following year, Adam Musa travelled with a caravan to Moyale, via Bardera and el Wak, returning through Hendille and the country around the Lori an Swamp. He obtained valuable information about the anterior and brought back enough ivory to cover the cost of the expedition. More important, however, he explained to the Bo ran and Ajuran “about the Somalis and kismayu Government”,^’ and the political implications of this were later significant. The Ogaden strongly resented this extension of Adam Musa s responsibilities. Equally, they resented their virtual exclusion from Government jobs. let their opportunity to challenge the Herti did not come until 1906. Up to that date, the Herti were thought of as loyal and dependable servants of the administration. The Ogaden, by contrast, were assumed to be untrustworthy. But the murder of Ali Hahar changed all that. The Ogaden and the Herti were now tarred with the same brush, there was little to choose between them. Just as the Herti had previously offered to help the Kismayu administration when there had been trouble with Afmadu, so now the Ogaden offered to chastise those Herti who were in revolt. However, this new image of the Ogaden as Government supporters had been preceded by ten years of tempestuous resistance to Government advances, and it was by no means clear that a period of calm lay ahead. Between 1895 and 1905? the essential difference of a forward Government policy from the point of view of the Ogaden and of the Herti was that, for the latter, this entailed their immediate encirclement, whereas, for the former, it presented a frontal attack with the consequent possibility of retreat. The Herti had no room for manoeuvre, and so they submitted. On the other hand, the Ogaden found that their own mobility was socially divisive and fissiparous, sinoe it was not shared equally by all sections. Those that could break away and retreat did so, while those that remained behind had to come to terms with the new administration, 1and this increased the level of social tension amongst the Ogaden At the same time, a forward Government policy threatened the existence of a relatively new tut important addition to the economic and social structure of the Ogaden, Victories over the Wardai and Boran Galla had led them to become the owners of large numbers of slaves. As a result they had departed from a purely pastoral 2way of life and, around Afmadu, cereals were extensively grown.
Within a year of Jenner* s arrival, however, it was certainly clear to the Ogaden “that when the British officers ^eldj. .their country, their slaves and wealth /would/* * necessarily pass away